Post-production services, such as sales, distribution, and maintenance, comprise a crucial element of business activity. We explore an international duopoly model in which a foreign …rm has the option of outsourcing post-production services to its domestic rival or providing those services by establishing its own facilities through FDI. We demonstrate that trade liberalization in goods may hurt domestic consumers and lower world welfare, and that the negative welfare impacts are turned into positive ones if service FDI is also liberalized. This …nding yields important policy implications, given the reality that the progress of liberalization in service sectors is still limited.
Introduction
Business activity does not end with the production of the …nal product. After production, a variety of business activities such as marketing, sales and distribution, and the provision of maintenance and repair services should be e¤ectively carried out to maximize the value of products that have been produced. This is a widely held view in the strategic management literature. Porter (1985) , for example, pointed out that …rms'primary activities can be divided into inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing and sales, and service. In Porter's classi…cation, outbound logistics means activities associated with collecting, storing, and physically distributing the product to buyers, marketing and sales means activities associated with providing a means by which buyers can purchase the product and inducing them to do so, and service means activities associated with providing service to enhance or maintain the value of the product.
In the present paper, outbound logistics, marketing and sales, and service are together referred to as "post-production services."A crucial strategic decision that every producer of …nal products needs to make is whether to perform post-production services by itself or outsource (some of) them to other …rms. Since proximity to customers is a crucial element for post-production services, this decision is particularly important in the context of international trade. Foreign producers often outsource post-production services to their domestic rivals. For example, automobiles manufactured by foreign auto-makers are often sold and distributed by their local rivals. 1 Alternatively, foreign producers can establish local a¢ liates in the domestic market and perform post-production services by themselves (foreign direct investment (FDI) in post-production services). 2 The objective of this paper is to analyze the provision of post-production services in the context of international trade and to explore its welfare consequences and policy implications. To this end, we explore an international duopoly model in which two …rms, one domestic and the other foreign, produce di¤erentiated products in their own countries and compete in the domestic market. Postproduction services must be performed before a product is consumed. 3 The foreign …rm has the option of outsourcing post-production services to its domestic rival by paying royalties or providing those services by itself in the domestic market. In the latter case, however, the foreign …rm must establish its own service facilities in the domestic market by incurring a …xed cost for FDI. 4 In our analysis, we take the following aspects of reality into account. Multilateral negotiations under GATT/WTO have greatly facilitated the liberalization of the trade in goods, and many countries have committed to maintain low levels of tari¤ rates. However, with respect to the trade in services, although the General Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS) came into e¤ect in 1995 as a result of the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations and has been contributing toward expanding trade in services, the progress is still limited. For instance, Roy et al. (2007) reported that only 52 WTO members had made commitments to liberalizing distribution services under GATS. The limited progress means that foreign …rms may still have to incur substantial extra costs for service FDI because of regulatory impediments. 5 Melitz (2003) , for example, pointed out that an exporting …rm must set up new distribution channels in the foreign country and conform to all the shipping rules speci…ed by the foreign customs agency, and that, although some of these costs cannot be avoided, others are often manipulated by governments. 6;7 When restrictions on service FDI are high, foreign …rms may have to rely on service outsourcing to perform post-production services in domestic markets. In fact, according to OECD (2001) , the number of the non-equity form of new 1 In the Japanese market, examples include Volkswagen-Toyota, Ford-Mazda, Volvo-Subaru, and Peugeot-Suzuki, among others. The following examples are also found in Japan. (i) Several pharmaceutical products produced by Bayer, a German …rm, are sold and distributed by its Japanese rivals, Meiji Seika and Kyorin Pharmaceutical. (ii) A Japanese liquor company, Suntory, sells wines, beers, whiskies, brandies, liqueurs, and mineral waters made by foreign companies. (iii) Evian, a mineral water made by French company Danone, is distributed in Japan by a Japanese beverage company, Calpis. Also, according to Ohmae (1989) , in the US pharmaceutical industry, Marion Laboratories distributes Tanabe's Herbesser and Chugai's Ulcerlmin; Merck distributes Yamanouchi's Gaster; and Eli Lilly distributes Fujisawa's Cefamezin. 2 For example, in the late 1980s a number of foreign auto-makers such as BMW, Chrysler, and Mercedes-Benz established their own distribution networks in Japan. 3 We focus on a class of post-production services that are indispensable for consumption of goods but do not a¤ect demand of goods. See Section 2 for details. 4 It should be emphasized that our approach is fundamentally di¤erent from the incomplete contracting approach which has been recently applied to the analysis of vertical structures in the context of international trade. For details, see the second last paragraph of this section. 5 In his recent study on restrictiveness of FDI, Golub (2003) adopted "obligatory screening and approval procedures" and "restrictions on foreign ownership" as two main restrictions, and found that FDI restrictions on business and distribution services are higher than those on manufacturing. 6 Melitz's argument is based on a number of interviews with managers in Colombian …rms making export decisions conducted by Roberts and Tybout (1997) . 7 In the late 80's, Toysrus'retail establishment was delayed in Japan because of the Large-scale Retail Store Low. The United States considered that its application was arbitrary and regarded the low as a typical impediment against service FDI.
cross-border alliances in business services increased from 25 in 1989 to 1097 in 2000.
In our framework, the liberalization of the trade in services reduces the …xed cost of service FDI, and the liberalization of the trade in goods reduces the tari¤. The connection between production and post-production services, uniquely captured by our model, yields novel welfare consequences and policy implications as outlined below. Suppose that both the tari¤ rate and the …xed cost for service FDI are initially high. We demonstrate a possibility that, contrary to the conventional result, a tari¤ reduction hurts consumers and reduces world welfare. As in the standard analyses, the direct e¤ect of a tari¤ reduction is bene…cial for consumers and the foreign …rm, but is harmful for the domestic …rm. In our framework, however, the domestic …rm can mitigate the negative e¤ect of a tari¤ reduction by raising the price it charges the foreign …rm for post-production services, and the higher service price works in the direction of raising goods prices. We show that, from the welfare standpoint, the latter e¤ect can overshadow the former e¤ect so that the tari¤ reduction actually hurts consumers and reduces world welfare in equilibrium.
Importantly, if the …xed cost for service FDI is also reduced, the domestic …rm has less room to increase the service price in response to the tari¤ reduction, and a su¢ cient reduction of the …xed cost for service FDI converts the negative welfare e¤ect of tari¤ reduction into a positive e¤ect. In other words, the liberalization of service FDI can convert a welfare-reducing trade liberalization into a welfare-enhancing trade liberalization. Interestingly, the liberalization of service FDI improves welfare even when it does not induce the foreign …rm to actually undertake service FDI. We believe that these are important policy implications, given that post-production services consist of an important subclass of services, 8 and that foreign …rms'di¢ culties in undertaking post-production services in the domestic market have been recently considered to be a serious non-tari¤ barrier. 9 We should mention that we construct a highly stylized model to make our point in a transparent way. Our model, however, can be extended in a number of ways. For example, non-producers of the good (or, independent service organizations (ISOs)) sometimes perform post-production services for goods producers. Our model can incorporate ISOs by assuming that the foreign …rm can outsource services to the domestic …rm or one of the ISOs. Also, we can incorporate more than one domestic …rm. We discuss the robustness of our …ndings under a number of alternative setups in Subsection 4.2.
Cross-border transactions of services and FDI in services have been previously studied in the trade literature. 10 Recently, several papers have considered market access and distribution, an important example of post-production services, in the context of international trade. Richardson (2004) has shown in a spatial-economy model that the domestic government has an incentive to open the access to retail distribution to foreign manufacturers when tari¤s can be used, but it may limit the access when trade policy is not available. Francois and Wooton (2007) assume that sales of imported goods require the domestic distribution services that are supplied under imperfect competition. They have shown that trade volumes and the level of optimal tari¤ are positively related to the degree of competitiveness in the service sector. In these previous models, production and distribution of goods are assumed to be conducted in di¤erent industries. Qiu (2007) has developed a model to study …rms' incentives to form cross-border strategic alliances and their choice of entry modes in foreign markets. In his two-country, multi-…rm model, each …rm's cost of distributing its products in the foreign country is assumed to become lower when the …rm forms a strategic alliance with a …rm in the foreign country. It should be noted that Qiu uses the term distribution costs to represent all costs incurred after production, which are costs for post-production services in our terminology.
Our paper is related to the previous studies mentioned above in the sense that we also investigate post-production services in the context of international trade. There are, however, some fundamental di¤erences. In our model, the foreign …rm determines whether it performs post-production services by itself or outsources them to its domestic rival. This decision is made under the strategic interactions between the foreign …rm and the domestic …rm, and their strategic interactions in the product market and the provision of post-production services are linked in our model. This linkage, which is uniquely explored in our analysis, in turn yields novel welfare and policy implications for the liberalization of both the trade in goods and service FDI. To our knowledge, our analysis is the …rst attempt to examine the linkage between FDI in post-production services and product market competition.
Also, our analysis is distinctively di¤erent from the incomplete contracting approach that has been recently applied to the analyses of vertical structures in the context of international trade; see Antràs (2003 Antràs ( , 2005 ; Antràs and Helpman (2004) ; Grossman and Helpman (2004); and Feenstra and Hanson (2005) . 11 Their analyses address the choice between vertical integration and the purchase of a specialized input through contractual outsourcing, where relationship-speci…c investments governed by incomplete contracts play a central role. In contrast, as mentioned above, we focus on the connection between production and post-production services in the context of international trade, and examine its welfare and policy implications. Given our focus, we do not address relationspeci…city of investment and incompleteness of contracting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops an international duopoly model that captures the linkage between FDI in post-production services and product market competition, and derives the equilibrium of the model. Section 3 investigates the e¤ects of the liberalization of trade in goods, the liberalization of FDI for post-production services, and the connection between them. Section 4 elaborates on the policy implications of our …ndings and explores the robustness of the results under a number of alternative setups. Section 5 summarizes the paper and o¤ers concluding remarks, which include a discussion on the di¤erence between post-production services and intermediate inputs in our framework. The Appendix contains proofs of lemmas and propositions.
The Model
Demands in the home country are characterized by a representative consumer who consumes non-numéraire goods as well as a numéraire good. The non-numéraire goods consist of goods D 1 1 See also Spencer (2005) and Helpman (2006) for a recent survey of the literature. and F which are imperfect substitutes. The numéraire good is competitively produced and freely traded between countries. The indirect utility function is given by
where p D and p F are the prices of good D and good F respectively, and Y is the income in the domestic country. 12 Let V i = @V (p D ; p F ) =@p i and V ij = @ 2 V (p D ; p F ) =(@p i @p j ) denote the …rst derivative and the second derivative of the subutility function V (p D ; p F ). We assume V i < 0, V ii > 0, and V ij < 0 (i 6 = j).
By the Roy's identity, the demand function of good
We also assume jV ii j > jV ij j, which implies that the own-price e¤ect on demand is larger than the cross-price e¤ect.
We consider an international duopoly model in which the domestic …rm (…rm D) and the foreign …rm (…rm F ) engage in Bertrand competition in the domestic market. Firm D and …rm F respectively produce good D and good F . The unit cost of producing goods is identical across …rms and constant, which is normalized to zero without loss of generality. An ad valorem tari¤, t ( 0), is imposed on imports of good F . Post-production services must be performed before a product is consumed. We capture this by assuming that one unit of post-production services must be performed for one unit of goods to be consumed. Note that we focus on a class of postproduction services that are indispensable for consumption of goods but do not a¤ect demand of goods. It includes distribution and certain types of maintenance. 13 To perform post-production services, …rms must have service facilities in the domestic country. Assume that …rm D has already established its facilities to perform post-production services for good D in the domestic market. Firm D can also perform post-production services for good F at the same unit cost c S . 14 We assume that post-production services can be performed only by goods producers (…rms D and F ) because of economy of scope. See Subsection 4.2 for a discussion on an extension of our model in which independent service organizations can also perform post-production services for …rm F .
Firm F can perform post-production services for good F by itself with the same unit service cost c S by establishing local facilities for performing post-production services in the domestic market. We assume that, if …rm F undertakes FDI in post-production services, it incurs a …xed investment cost K ( 0). Note that the tari¤ on imports is still e¤ective even if FDI in post-production services is made, which is in contrast to "tari¤-jumping" FDI in production.
In sum, we consider the following two options for …rm F to perform post-production services in the domestic market: (i) Service FDI: Firm F performs post-production services for good F by incurring a …xed cost K to establish its service facilities; or (ii) Service Outsourcing: Firm F outsources post-production services to …rm D, which charges a service price (or royalty) of r (> 0) per unit of services. We assume K is su¢ ciently low so that …rm F can earn positive pro…t under service FDI. 1 2 The indirect utility function is derived from a standard quasi-linear utility function given by u(xD; xF ; M ) = v(xD; xF ) + M where xD and xF denote the consumption of good D and that of good F respectively, and M is the consumption of the numéraire good.
1 3 For example, systematic provision of maintenance services is indispensable for the usage of photocopiers. The post-production services which is considered in the paper do not include marketing, because demand of goods tends to be increasing in intensity of marketing activities.
1 4 We assume that the …xed cost for service outsourcing is zero. The qualitative nature of our results remains unchanged under an alternative setup in which the …xed cost must be incurred by …rm D and/or …rm F . The formal analysis of this case can be found in the discussion-paper version of the paper (Ishikawa et al., 2008) . See also Subsection 4.2 for a discussion.
5
We can express the operating pro…ts of the two …rms (i.e., the pro…t gross of the …xed cost) as
(1)
where is the parameter which takes = 1 if …rm F outsources post-production services to …rm D and = 0 if it chooses FDI in post-production services. Consumer surplus and domestic welfare are respectively given by 
, an increase in p i also lowers world welfare unless p j > p i holds and the magnitude of the cross-price e¤ect is su¢ ciently close to that of the own-price e¤ect. 15 To simplify the analysis, we consider the case where both @W W (p D ; p F )=@p D < 0 and @W W (p D ; p F )=@p F < 0 hold in equilibrium. 16 We consider a three-stage game. The timing of the game is as follows. If r is o¤ered, …rm F determines whether to accept the o¤er. 17 We assume that, if …rm F accepts the o¤er, it commits to outsourcing all post-production services for good F in the domestic market. Under this assumption, we can treat two options -service FDI and service outsourcing -as distinctive alternatives. If …rm F rejects the o¤er, or if …rm D does not o¤er r in Stage 1, …rm F undertakes FDI in post-production services.
[Stage 3]: Firms D and F simultaneously set prices of their own products, and then consumers make purchase decisions. We assume D and F are supermoduler in prices so that the prices are strategic complements.
For expositional simplicity, we adopt the following tie-breaking rules: (i) If …rm F is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting a service price r o¤ered by …rm D at stage 1, …rm F accepts it.
(ii) If …rm D is indi¤erent between o¤ering and not o¤ering r, …rm D does not o¤er it.
Product market competition
In this subsection, we derive the equilibria of Stage-3 subgames. The game has two Stage-3 subgames depending on decisions made at Stage 2: (i) FDI subgame: Firm F undertakes FDI 1 5 By substituting CS(pD; pF ), (1), and (2) into W W (pD; pF ), world welfare becomes
1 6 Since we have
and @W W (pD; pF )=@pj > 0 (i 6 = j) never hold at the same time. Even if @W W (pD; pF )=@pi > 0 (i = D or F ) holds in equilibrium, the main results of the paper would remain unchanged. That is, a tari¤ reduction deteriorates world welfare under a range of parameterizations, and a su¢ cient reduction of the …xed cost for service FDI converts the negative welfare e¤ect of tari¤ reduction into a positive e¤ect. The analysis, however, becomes much more complicated and results on world welfare presented in Lemma 1, Propositions 2 and 4 need some adjustments. See the Appendix for details.
1 7 We simplify the analysis by assuming that the equilibrium level of r is determined by …rm D's take-it-or-leave-it service price o¤er. See Subsection 4.2 for a discussion on the robustness of our results under more general bargaining procedures in which the two …rms share the surplus from service outsourcing. 6 in post-production services at Stage 2; (ii) Outsourcing (OS) subgame: …rm F outsources post-production services to …rm D at Stage 2.
Throughout our analysis, we assume that the market size for each good is large enough and the tari¤ rate t is small enough so that each …rm i (= D, F ) sells a strictly positive amount of good i in the domestic market in equilibrium. We also assume that the game has a unique equilibrium in the entire range of relevant parameterizations.
FDI subgame
Let us begin with the FDI subgame, in which = 0 applies in (1) and (2). In the third stage, each …rm maximizes its own pro…t. The Nash equilibrium in prices is obtained by solving the following …rst-order conditions
Denote the equilibrium prices in the FDI subgame as e p D (c S ; t) and e p F (c S ; t). The producer price of good F is given by e p F (c S ; t) =(1 + t). By substituting these prices into the demand functions, the equilibrium sales are given by e x D (c S ; t) and e x F (c S ; t). The equilibrium operating pro…ts in the FDI subgame are given by
2.1.2. OS subgame Next turn to the OS subgame, where = 1 applies in equations (1) and (2). In the third stage, each …rm maximizes its pro…t with respect to its price given the service price, r, set by …rm D in the …rst stage. The …rst-order conditions become
By solving these equations, we …nd the equilibrium prices in the OS subgame as b p D (r; t) and b p F (r; t). We obtain the following lemma (see Appendix for the proof).
Lemma 1. In the equilibrium of the OS subgame, a rise in the service price increases the prices of both goods and reduces the consumer surplus and world welfare, holding the tari¤ rate …xed.
The logic behind the lemma can be explained as follows. Given …rm F 's price and the tari¤ rate, an increase in the service price raises …rm D's pro…t-margin from service outsourcing. This in turn makes …rm D more willing to raise p D so that x F (p D ; p F ) increases. As a result, …rm D's optimal price increases in its service price, r. Besides that, given …rm D's price and the tari¤ rate, …rm F 's optimal price increases in its marginal cost, r. Since the prices of the two goods are strategic complements, the incentives to raise prices for both …rms lead to higher prices for both …rms.
By substituting b p D (r; t) and b p F (r; t) into the demand functions, the equilibrium sales are given by b
x D (r; t) and b x F (r; t). Then, the equilibrium pro…ts of …rms are respectively expressed as
Before discussing the equilibrium of the entire game, the following property is worth noting.
, and b i (r; t) = e i (c S ; t) (i = fD; F g) are satis…ed.
When r = c S , the third-term of (7) disappears, and the …rst-order conditions in the OS subgame coincide with those in the FDI subgame. This implies that the equilibrium outcomes in both subgames become the same.
Firm F 's decision
In this subsection, we discuss …rm F 's choice between service outsourcing and service FDI. If …rm F does not accept r o¤ered by …rm D (or if …rm D does not o¤er any service price), then …rm F 's equilibrium pro…t in the subsequent FDI subgame is e F (c S ; t) K, which is independent of r. If …rm F accepts the o¤er, its equilibrium pro…t in the subsequent OS subgame is b F (r; t). Let b 0 i;r (r; t) @b i (r; t)=@r (i = D; F ). Using the envelope theorem, we have
The …rst term, which is negative, represents the direct e¤ect of an increase in the service price on …rm F 's pro…t in the equilibrium of the OS subgame. The second term, which is positive, represents the strategic e¤ect meaning that a higher r induces a higher p D , which in turn increases the demand for good F and then increases …rm F 's pro…t. For expositional simplicity, we focus on the case in which the direct e¤ect dominates the indirect e¤ect so that b 0 F;r (r; t) < 0 holds for all relevant r, which is true under linear demand functions for example. Analogous assumptions are typically made in the literature that considers price competition in a di¤erentiated-oligopoly model (see Ordover et al., 1990; Chen, 2001; Chen et al., 2004 , for instance). 18 Given b 0 F;r (r; t) < 0 for all r, there exists a unique r (> 0) such that
We have b F (r; t) < e F (c S ; t) K for all r > r, and hence r is the maximum acceptable service price from …rm F 's standpoint. 19 If evaluated at r = c S , we have b F (r; t) e F (c S ; t) K with 1 8 We can verify that if @ b pD (r; t) =@r 1, b 0 F;r (r; t) < 0 always holds. For instance, when demand functions are linear, @ b pD (r; t) =@r < 1 necessarily holds. If @ b pD (r; t) =@r > 1, on the other hand, we can verify that b 0 F;r (r; t) < 0 holds if @xF =@pD is su¢ ciently small. See Appendix for details.
1 9 If b 0 F;r (r; t) < 0 does not hold for some r, our results remain mostly unchanged as long as there exists a value r 0 > 0 such that b F (r 0 ; t) = e F (cS; t) K and b F (r; t) < e F (cS; t) K for all r > r 0 . However, the analysis becomes complicated without providing new insights. 8 equality if K = 0 (see Lemma 2). This implies that r > c S holds if K > 0 and r = c S holds if K = 0. The determination of r is depicted in Figure 1 , where the horizontal axis is the level of the service price and the downward-sloping curve represents b F (r; t). At r = c S , b F (r; t) = e F (c S ; t) holds and r is determined to satisfy b F ( r; t) = e F (c S ; t) K. It is easy to con…rm by the …gure that r > c S holds as long as K > 0 and r approaches c S as K approaches zero (see Lemma 5 below).
[Insert Figure 1 around here] Let K denote the …xed cost such that e F (c S ; t) = K holds. We assume K < K which implies e F (c S ; t) K > 0, and hence b F ( r; t) > 0. This in turn implies that each …rm i (= D, F ) sells a strictly positive amount of good i in the domestic market in the equilibrium of the OS subgame for all r 2 [c S ; r].
Equilibrium of the entire game
We now derive the equilibrium of the entire game. The equilibrium is either an Outsourcing (OS) equilibrium in which …rm F outsources post-production services to …rm D, or an FDI equilibrium in which …rm F undertakes FDI in post-production services. Using the envelope theorem, we have the e¤ect of an increase in r on …rm D's equilibrium pro…t in the OS subgame, b
An increase in r raises the price of good F . An increase in p F in turn increases the sales of good D and bene…ts …rm D, but it decreases the sales of good F and reduces the pro…t from performing post-production services for …rm F . These e¤ects are represented in the …rst term of the above equation. An increase in r also raises the per-unit pro…t from post-production services, which is represented in the second term of the equation. It is straightforward to show that b 0 D;r (r; t) > 0 holds for r c S . For r > c S , b 0 D;r (r; t) > 0 holds only if the di¤erence between r and c S is not too large. In what follows, we focus our analysis on the case in which 0 D;r (r; t) > 0 holds for all r 2 (c S ; r]. This condition is imposed for expositional simplicity. Under this condition, if …rm D o¤ers its service price so that the o¤er is accepted by …rm F , …rm D o¤ers the maximum acceptable price r = r. If it does not hold, then …rm D sets r < r in the equilibrium, but our main results would remain unchanged (see Subsection 4.2 for details).
Proposition 1 below characterizes the equilibrium of the entire game.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium of the entire game is an OS equilibrium if K > 0 and an FDI equilibrium if K = 0.
Since …rm D incurs no …xed costs to provide …rm F with post-production services, its pro…t in the equilibrium of the OS subgame is no worse than those in the equilibrium of the FDI subgame as long as r c S . If K > 0, we have r > c S and so b D (r; t) > e D (c S ; t) holds. In this case, …rm D o¤ers r which …rm F accepts, and the equilibrium of the entire game becomes an OS equilibrium. If K = 0, on the other hand, we have r = c S and so b D (r; t) = e D (c S ; t) holds by Lemma 2. Hence, …rm D does not o¤er r and the equilibrium of the entire game becomes an FDI equilibrium.
If we introduce a …xed cost of service outsourcing which …rm D must incur, the equilibrium of the entire game can be an FDI equilibrium even with positive K. Our results would remain unchanged under this alternative setup (see Subsection 4.2 for details).
Liberalization of goods trade and service FDI
This section investigates the e¤ects of the liberalization of trade in goods, the liberalization of FDI for post-production services, and the connection between them. In our analysis, the trade liberalization is represented by a reduction in the tari¤ rate, t, and the liberalization of service FDI is represented by a reduction in the …xed cost of service FDI, K. Let t 0 2 (0; t] denote the tari¤ rate before the trade liberalization, and K 0 2 (0; K) denote the …xed cost of service FDI before the liberalization of service FDI. Note that proofs of lemmas and propositions are presented in the Appendix.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the trade liberalization of goods has recently made substantial progress through multilateral negotiations under GATT/WTO, while the progress of the liberalization in service sectors has been slow so far. Given this, we …rst investigate the e¤ects of tari¤ reduction, holding K …xed at the pre-liberalization level, K 0 . We then investigate the e¤ects of the liberalization of service FDI, showing that the liberalization of service FDI can convert a welfare-reducing trade liberalization into a welfare-enhancing trade liberalization. We also show that, holding the tari¤ rate …xed, the liberalization of service FDI unambiguously improves welfare.
We …rst investigate the e¤ects of the trade liberalization on the service price in the outsourcing equilibrium. Let r(t) denote the equilibrium service price as a function of t, and consider the e¤ect of a tari¤ reduction from t to t . We …nd that r(t) < r(t ) holds (that is, the trade liberalization increases the equilibrium service price), if b F ( r(t); t ) > e F (c S ; t ) K holds. Under this condition, the tari¤ reduction increases …rm F 's equilibrium pro…t more in the OS subgame than in the FDI subgame. Then, …rm D can absorb this gap by increasing the service price from r(t) to r(t ) so that …rm F becomes indi¤erent between FDI and OS (that is, b F ( r(t ); t ) = e F (c S ; t ) K holds). The idea mentioned above can be formalized as follows. Firm F 's pro…t is b F (r; t) in the equilibrium of the OS subgame and e F (c S ; t) K in the equilibrium of the FDI subgame. At Stage 1, …rm D charges the service price r = r at which …rm F is indi¤erent between outsourcing and not outsourcing post-production services. Hence, for any given K 2 (0; K), r is determined by b F ( r; t) = e F (c S ; t) K, which implies
where e 0 F;t (c S ; t) @e F (c S ; t) =@t and b
F;r (r; t) < 0, the following lemma is immediate from (13).
Lemma 3. In the OS equilibrium, dr=dt < 0 holds if and only if e 0 F;t (c S ; t) b 0 F;t (r; t) > 0 holds.
Lemma 3 says that a reduction in tari¤ raises the equilibrium service price if and only if e 0 F;t (c S ; t) b 0 F;t (r; t) > 0 holds. Using (6) and (10), we …nd
Note that e 0 F;t (c S ; t) b 0 F;t (r; t) > 0 holds if a tari¤ increase reduces …rm F 's pro…t more in the equilibrium of the OS subgame than in the equilibrium of the FDI subgame, holding the service price in the OS subgame …xed at r = r.
Let us …rst hold prices and quantities …xed, and consider the direct e¤ect of a tari¤ increase on the di¤erence of …rm F 's pro…t in the two types of equilibrium. This e¤ect is captured by the …rst term of the RHS of (14). A tari¤ increase results in a decrease in …rm F 's pro…t, where the decrement of …rm F 's pro…t is the same as the decrement of …rm F 's revenue. In the equilibrium of the OS subgame with the service price r = r, …rm F 's unit cost of production is r, which is greater than its unit cost c S in the equilibrium of the FDI subgame. The higher unit cost works in the direction of making …rm F 's revenue smaller in the equilibrium of the OS subgame. At the same time, however, service outsourcing induces …rm D to charge a higher price to goods D so that …rm F can sell more, because …rm D can make pro…t from selling services to …rm F . In other words, service outsourcing weakens the degree of product market competition. This e¤ect works in the direction of making …rm F 's revenue greater in the equilibrium of the OS subgame. When the latter e¤ect dominates the former, …rm F 's revenue is higher in the equilibrium of the OS subgame than in the equilibrium of the FDI subgame. In such cases, an increase in the ad valorem tari¤ reduces …rm F 's revenue more in the OS subgame than in the FDI subgame holding prices and quantities …xed, implying that the sign of the direct e¤ect is positive. We verify in the proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix that the direct e¤ect is indeed positive under a range of parameterizations in the linear demand system.
Next consider the strategic e¤ect of a tari¤ increase, which is captured by the second term of the RHS of (14). A tari¤ increase induces an increase in …rm D's price, which in turn induces …rm F to produce more. 20 The strategic e¤ect increases …rm F 's equilibrium pro…t, where the increment can be either larger or smaller in the OS subgame than in the FDI subgame. Hence the sign of the second term can also be positive or negative.
The sign of e Next we consider the e¤ects of the trade liberalization on the equilibrium goods prices. Suppose that the trade liberalization decreases the equilibrium service price (that is, suppose that dr=dt > 0 holds). Then the liberalization unambiguously reduces …rm F 's costs, and the lower service price means that the degree of product market competition becomes tougher. All these elements imply that the trade liberalization decreases the equilibrium prices of goods D and F , and this in turn implies that the trade liberalization increases consumer surplus and world welfare. However, dr=dt < 0 can hold as mentioned above. If the trade liberalization increases the equilibrium service price, then its e¤ects on the equilibrium goods prices become ambiguous. We obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Holding K …xed at K 0 , there exist unique critical values D < 0 and F < 0 such that db p i ( r; t)=dt < 0 holds if and only if dr dt < i
holds, where i = D, F .
Lemma 4 tells us that the trade liberalization of goods increases the equilibrium goods price(s) if dr=dt is su¢ ciently negative. Totally di¤erentiating b p i (r; t) with respect to t, we obtain
A tari¤ decrease directly reduces …rm F 's cost and this works in the direction of reducing the equilibrium goods prices (i.e., @ b p i (r; t)=@t > 0). However, if dr=dt < 0, an induced increase in the service price works in the direction of increasing the equilibrium goods prices (i.e., @ b p i (r; t)=@r (dr=dt) < 0) since it raises …rm F 's cost and also weakens the degree of product market competition. The former direct e¤ect is dominated by the latter induced e¤ect if dr=dt is su¢ ciently negative, implying that the trade liberalization increases the equilibrium goods price(s). More speci…cally, if dr=dt < f@ b p i (r; t)=@tg=f@ b p i (r; t)=@rg i , the trade liberalization of goods increases the price of good i (see the proof of Lemma 4 in the Appendix).
Lemma 4 indicates that, if K is …xed at K 0 , a tari¤ reduction may harm consumers and reduce world welfare by increasing the equilibrium consumer prices. Proposition 2 formalizes this by investigating how the trade liberalization of goods, if not accompanied by the liberalization of FDI for post-production services, a¤ects consumers, world welfare, and …rms' pro…tability. In what follows, let CS(K; t), W W (K; t), D (K; t), and F (K; t); respectively, denote consumer surplus, world welfare, …rm D's pro…t, and …rm F 's pro…t in the equilibrium of the entire game.
Proposition 2. Holding K …xed at K 0 , there exists a range of parameterizations in which a tari¤ reduction hurts consumers, deteriorates world welfare, and bene…ts …rm D. More precisely, that the demand function for good i is linear and given by xi(pD; pF ) = a pi + bpj (i; j 2 fD; F g; i 6 = j), where a (> 0) and b 2 [0; 1) respectively represent the market size and the substitutability of the two products. We can verify that there exists a value b 0 2 (0; 1) such that the direct e¤ect in the RHS of (14) takes a negative value and hence e Proposition 2 tells us that a tari¤ reduction necessarily harms consumers, deteriorates world welfare, and bene…ts …rm D, if it increases the equilibrium prices of both goods D and F (that is, if dr=dt < min[ D ; F ]). Note that this condition is su¢ cient but not necessary. The negative welfare e¤ects may persist when a tari¤ reduction increases at least one of the goods prices (that is, if dr=dt < max[ D ; F ]). As shown in the proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix, dr=dt < min[ D ; F ] holds under a range of parameterizations in a linear demand system. How can the negative impacts of tari¤ reduction be resolved? We address this question by exploring the connection between the trade liberalization of goods and the liberalization of service FDI.
Proposition 3. Take any parameterization in which @CS(K; t 0 )=@t > 0 and @W W (K; t 0 )=@t > 0 hold for some K. There exists a unique K CS 2 (0; K] such that @CS(K; t 0 )=@t < 0 hold for all K 2 (0; K CS ), and a unique K W W 2 (0; K] such that @W W (K; t 0 )=@t < 0 hold for all K 2 (0; K W W ).
Suppose CS(K; t 0 )=@t > 0 and @W W (K; t 0 )=@t > 0 hold, so that a tari¤ reduction at t = t 0 hurts consumers and decreases world welfare. Proposition 2 tells us that these conditions hold under a range of parameterizations in which d r=dt is su¢ ciently negative. Proposition 3 says that these negative e¤ects of the tari¤ reduction disappear and turn into positive ones when K is reduced to a su¢ ciently low level by the liberalization of service FDI. Lemma 5 below is useful to understand the logic behind Proposition 3.
Lemma 5. The equilibrium service price r is strictly increasing in K for all K 2 (0; K).
Recall that the equilibrium service price is determined by the condition b F (r; t) = e F (c S ; t) K (equation (12)), where …rm F is indi¤erent between service outsourcing and FDI. Firm F 's equilibrium pro…t in the equilibrium of the FDI subgame, e F (c S ; t) K, is decreasing in K. Then, since b F (r; t) is decreasing in r, …rm D can charge a higher price for the post-production services as K increases, resulting in the lemma.
The liberalization of service FDI decreases K, which in turn reduces the equilibrium service price r. As K approaches zero, r approaches c S . Recall d r=dt = [e 0 F;t (c S ; t) b 0 F;t (r; t)]=b 0 F;r (r; t) (see equation (13)). As r approaches c S , the numerator e 0 F;t (c S ; t) b 0 F;t (r; t) approaches zero while the denominator approaches e 0 F;r (c S ; t) < 0. Hence, d r=dt approaches zero as r approaches c S , implying that the impact of the induced change in service price becomes negligible if K becomes su¢ ciently small. However, since the direct e¤ect of trade liberalization always reduces the goods prices (i.e., @ b p i (r; t)=@t > 0), i = f@ b p i (r; t)=@tg=f@ b p i (r; t)=@rg (< 0) does not approach zero as r approaches c S . Then, when K is reduced to a su¢ ciently low level, d r=dt becomes su¢ ciently close to zero so that dr=dt < max[ D ; F ] does not hold any more. Equation (16) then implies that we can always …nd a unique positive cut-o¤ level of the …xed cost below which the direct e¤ect of trade liberalization necessarily dominates the induced increase in the service price and so a tari¤ reduction always decreases the prices of both goods. More speci…cally, let b K > 0 and b Proposition 3 then tells us that the negative welfare e¤ects of tari¤ reduction disappears and turns into positive ones when K is reduced to a su¢ ciently low level. 23 In other words, when the di¤erence between r and c S is su¢ ciently reduced by lowering K (see Lemma 5 and Figure 1) , the e¤ect of tari¤ reduction on …rm F 's equilibrium pro…t in the OS subgame gets closer to the one in the FDI subgame. This in turn implies that there is less room for …rm D to raise the service price in response to the reduction in tari¤, turning the negative welfare e¤ects of tari¤ reduction into positive ones. This is what Proposition 3 says. Interestingly, the liberalization of service FDI can convert a welfare-reducing tari¤ reduction into a welfare-enhancing tari¤ reduction even though the reduction in K does not induce …rm F to actually invest in service FDI in equilibrium as long as K > 0.
Finally, we explore the e¤ect of the liberalization of service FDI, holding the tari¤ rate …xed. As shown in the Appendix, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4. For any given t, CS(K; t), W W (K; t), and F (K; t) are decreasing in K while
A decrease in K reduces the equilibrium service price r (see Lemma 5), and hence …rm F 's costs become lower, resulting in an increase in its pro…t. The lower service price also means that the degree of product market competition becomes tougher. Both of these elements imply that the liberalization of service FDI increases consumer surplus and world welfare, while it decreases …rm D's equilibrium pro…t. It is interesting, again, to note that a reduction in K yields pro-competitive consequences even though the reduction in K does not induce …rm F to actually invest in service FDI in the equilibrium as long as K > 0.
Firm F undertakes service FDI when K = 0. As Proposition 5 below tells us, when the liberalization of service FDI reduces K down to zero, any tari¤ reduction has positive welfare e¤ects.
Proposition 5. Under an FDI equilibrium, a tari¤ reduction necessarily bene…ts consumers, hurts …rm D, and improves world welfare. More precisely, @CS (K; t) =@t < 0, @ D (K; t) =@t > 0, and @W W (K; t) =@t < 0 hold when K = 0.
It should be noted that a reduction of c S also decreases r. As a …nal point to this section, therefore, we compare a reduction of K with a reduction of c S regarding their e¤ects on resolving the negative impacts of tari¤ reductions. As shown in Proposition 3, a su¢ cient reduction of K converts a welfare-reducing tari¤ reduction into a welfare-enhancing tari¤ reduction. A reduction of K increases …rm F 's pro…t in the equilibrium of the FDI subgame, e F (c S ; t) K, and this in turn decreases the equilibrium service price r that is determined by b F (r; t) = e F (c S ; t) K. As K approaches zero, r approaches c S and so e 0 F;t (c S ; t) b 0 F;t (r; t) approaches zero. Hence there always exist strictly positive cut-o¤ values of K such that a reduction of K below these values converts a welfare-reducing tari¤ reduction into a welfare-enhancing tari¤ reduction.
Note that these properties are not necessary for Proposition 3.
2 3 More precisely, Proposition 3 says that we can always …nd unique
. See the proof of the proposition for details.
Since a reduction of c S also increases e F (c S ; t) K, it has an e¤ect similar to the e¤ect of reduction of K mentioned above. 24 However, there is a di¤erence between these e¤ects. Although a reduction of c S reduces r as a reduction of K does, r does not approach c S when c S approaches zero, and hence e 0 F;t (c S ; t) b 0 F;t (r; t) does not approach zero as c S approaches zero. Therefore, even if c S is reduced to zero, a welfare-reducing tari¤ reduction is not necessarily converted into a welfare-increasing tari¤ reduction, while a su¢ cient reduction of K necessarily accomplishes such a conversion.
Discussion
When a foreign …rm outsources post-production services to its domestic rival …rm, the liberalization of trade in goods could raise the price for service outsourcing. The rise in the service price could hurt consumers and reduce world welfare by inducing goods prices to rise. We have demonstrated a possibility that the liberalization of trade in goods generates negative welfare effects in our framework. We have then shown that the liberalization of service FDI converts a welfare-reducing trade liberalization into a welfare-enhancing trade liberalization. In this section, we …rst discuss the policy implications of our results, and then explore the robustness of our results under alternative modelling choices.
Policy implications
Through multilateral negotiations under GATT/WTO, countries have been lowering the barriers for the trade in goods. Growing attention is now being paid to the market access of foreign …rms in the service sector. The GATT Uruguay Round negotiations succeeded in establishing the framework of liberalizing cross-country transactions of services, that is, the GATS. The actual degree of liberalization, however, has been relatively small. For instance, Roy et al. (2007) reported that only 52 WTO members had made commitments to liberalizing distribution services under GATS. Under the limited progress of liberalization in the service sector, many foreign …rms still face signi…cantly high costs for service FDI, which prevent them from establishing local service facilities to perform post-production services by themselves in the local market.
In our theoretical framework, the current state of the world corresponds to a situation in which the tari¤ rate t is reduced to a reasonably low level but the …xed cost for service FDI, K, is still high. The liberalization of trade in goods bene…ts consumers and enhances world welfare if it lowers the price for service outsourcing. Our analysis suggests, however, that policy makers should carefully access the e¤ects of the trade liberalization if it raises the service price. In particular, if the rise in the service price induces the prices of both goods D and F to rise, the trade liberalization necessarily harms consumers and deteriorates world welfare. Our analysis uncovers a previously unnoticed importance of the liberalization of service FDI in its connection to the trade liberalization by showing that a su¢ ciently large reduction of the …xed cost for service FDI converts a welfare-reducing trade liberalization into a welfare-enhancing trade liberalization. That is, the liberalization of service FDI is important not only because it reduces per-unit costs of post-production services but also because it recovers the gains from the trade liberalization of goods for both consumers and world welfare. Therefore, making progress on the liberalization of service FDI under GATS is crucial to secure positive welfare consequences of the trade liberalization under GATT/WTO.
Recently, many regional trade agreements (RTAs) have established codes for the liberalization in the service sector in addition to those for the liberalization of the trade in goods. In these RTAs, some countries have undertaken further commitments on the liberalization of FDI in postproduction services on top of the existing GATS commitments. For instance, in its RTA with Australia, Thailand allows Australian …rms 100% foreign equity ownership for distribution of their products, even though it limits foreign equity ownership up to 49% in its GATS distribution commitments. 25 Singapore made broader commitments on the retailing of certain goods in its RTAs with the US, Australia, and Korea. Our analysis indicates that RTAs with deeper commitments towards the liberalization of service FDI are more likely to make the trade liberalization procompetitive, suggesting that the recent proliferation of RTAs may be superior to the multilateral liberalization under GATT/WTO.
We end this subsection by commenting on horizontal FDI. Since horizontal FDI in production to serve the local market 'jumps'tari¤s, it has the same e¤ect as a tari¤ elimination. In our model, the tari¤ elimination may hurt consumers and reduce world welfare if it is not accompanied by the liberalization of service FDI. Our …ndings therefore indicate that, to secure its positive welfare consequences, the liberalization of FDI in production should be accompanied by the liberalization of service FDI.
Robustness
Bargaining power: The assumption that …rm D makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er gives …rm D all the bargaining power to set the service price. In what follows we discuss the robustness of our results under more general bargaining procedures in which the two …rms share the surplus from service outsourcing. Recall that, in the OS equilibrium, …rm D o¤ers the maximum acceptable service price r = r at which …rm F is indi¤erent between outsourcing the post-production services and performing the services by itself. We have shown that a tari¤ reduction increases the equilibrium service price r (that is, dr=dt < 0 holds) in a range of parameterizations, and, if dr=dt is su¢ ciently negative, a tari¤ reduction hurts consumers and reduces world welfare.
If the two …rms share the surplus through bargaining, the equilibrium service price,r, is less than r and decreasing in …rm F 's bargaining power. As long as …rm D retains su¢ ciently strong bargaining power, dr=dt can still be su¢ ciently negative so that a reduction in the tari¤ harms consumers and lowers world welfare, and a reduction in K through the liberalization of service FDI converts the welfare-reducing tari¤ reduction into a welfare-enhancing one. However, as …rm D's bargaining power approaches zero, r approaches c S and dr=dt approaches zero. Hence, when …rm D's bargaining power is su¢ ciently close to zero, a tari¤ reduction does not have the welfare-reducing e¤ect and consequently a reduction of K cannot play the role of converting the welfare-reducing trade liberalization into the welfare-enhancing one. However, as long as …rm D's bargaining power is non-zero, a reduction in K on top of a tari¤ reduction further increases consumer surplus and world welfare as in Proposition 4, and hence the liberalization of service FDI is still welfare-enhancing. Independent service organizations: Our model assumes that post-production services can be performed only by goods producers (…rms D and F ) because of economy of scope. Alternatively, suppose that several independent service organizations (ISOs) can also perform post-production services for …rm F at constant marginal cost c S + m. If …rm F rejects r o¤ered by …rm D, …rm F determines whether to undertake FDI in post-production services or outsource services to an ISO. Under the latter option, the game proceeds to an "ISO subgame" where the equilibrium service price is given by c S + m. Since outsourcing to an ISO does not weaken the product market competition, the pro…t function of each …rm in the equilibrium of the ISO subgame coincides with that in the equilibrium of the FDI subgame. Hence, each …rm's pro…t in the subsequent equilibrium is respectively given by e D (c S + m; t) and e F (c S + m; t).
Suppose m > 0; that is, goods producers have cost advantages over the ISOs in performing post-production services because of the economy of scope. In this case, there exists a unique r 0 such that b F ( r 0 ; t) = e F (c S + m; t) is satis…ed. Since outsourcing to …rm D weakens the degree of product market competition while outsourcing to the ISOs does not have such an e¤ect, b F (r; t) > e F (c S + m; t) holds when the service price is set at r = c S + m. This implies that the maximum acceptable service price satis…es r 0 > c S + m. F;r ( r 0 ; t) < 0 holds in a range of parameterizations. Also, as in Proposition 2, a tari¤ reduction hurts consumers and deteriorates world welfare in a range of parameterizations under this alternative setup. 26 Now consider the e¤ects of the liberalization in service FDI given m > 0. A reduction of K changes the equilibrium service price that …rm D charges if it a¤ects the value of …rm F 's outside option, that is, the maximum pro…t …rm F can earn if it rejects the service price …rm D o¤ers. Let K 0 denote the cut-o¤ level of …xed cost determined by e F (c S + m; t) = e F (c S ; t) K 0 . If K > K 0 , …rm F 's relevant outside option is outsourcing to an ISO rather than an FDI in services since it chooses the former upon its rejection of r o¤ered by …rm D. Since e F (c S + m; t) is independent of K, a reduction in K has no e¤ect as long as K > K 0 . Once K is su¢ ciently reduced to satisfy K K 0 , however, outsourcing to an ISO is not …rm F 's relevant outside option any more because …rm F would choose service FDI if it rejects service price r o¤ered by …rm D. This implies that, when trade the liberalization hurts consumers and reduces world welfare, the liberalization of service FDI mitigates the negative welfare e¤ect of tari¤ reduction and eventually turns it into a positive e¤ect in this alternative setup as well. Hence the qualitative nature of our results remains unchanged in the presence of ISOs as long as m > 0. Now suppose m < 0. That is, ISOs have a cost advantage over the goods producers in performing post-production services. Then e F (c S + m; t) > e F (c S ; t) K and e F (c S + m; t) > b F (r; t) hold for all K 0 and r c S , implying that …rm F outsources post-production services to an ISO at the price of c S + m in equilibrium for all K 0. A tari¤ reduction does not have negative welfare impacts, and the liberalization of service FDI plays no roles in this case. Analogous results hold when m = 0.
Fixed costs for service outsourcing: Firm D incurs no …xed costs for performing postproduction services for …rm F in our model, and consequently …rm D's pro…t in the equilibrium 2 6 With the linear demand functions, we can verify that d r 0 =dt < 0 always holds because e 0 F;t (cS + m; t) b 0 F;t ( r 0 ; t)g > 0 is always satis…ed.
of the OS subgame is no less than its pro…t in the equilibrium of the FDI subgame as long as r c S . As a result, …rm F undertakes service FDI in the equilibrium of the entire game only if K = 0. However, …xed costs for service outsourcing, such as costs for suitably adjusting …rm D's facilities and learning details on how to e¤ectively perform services for …rm F 's product, may often be non-negligible in reality.
In what follows, we discuss what happens under an alternative setup in which …rm D must incur a …xed cost for performing services for …rm F . 27 As in our base model, the maximum acceptable service price r satis…es r > c S when K > 0. However, …rm D does not o¤er r = r in the equilibrium if its gain from outsourcing, b D ( r; t) e D (c S ; t), is less than the …xed cost for service outsourcing. Hence, …rm F undertakes service FDI in the equilibrium even with K > 0, if …rm D's …xed cost is su¢ ciently high. Speci…cally, there exists a unique cut-o¤ value K 00 (> 0) such that the equilibrium of the entire game is the OS equilibrium if K 00 < K < K and it is the FDI equilibrium if 0 K K 00 . Our main results, however, remain mostly unchanged in this alternative setup. The only di¤erence is that the conversion from a welfare-reducing trade liberalization to a welfareenhancing trade liberalization may not be accomplished when the equilibrium of the game is an OS equilibrium, since K CS and K W W as de…ned in Proposition 3 can be smaller than K 00 . Nonetheless, the conversion does happen when K is reduced to a su¢ ciently low level. In this case, we can verify that dr =dt < 0 can hold, and a tari¤ reduction hurts consumers and reduces world welfare under a range of parameterizations as in our base model. 28 A reduction of K has no e¤ects as long as r < r holds. Since r is increasing in K while r is independent of K, there is a unique cut-o¤ value K (> 0) such that r r holds if K K . Therefore, once K is reduced below K , …rm D charges r = r in the equilibrium and the subsequent analysis becomes identical to the one in the base model. Two-part tari¤s for service outsourcing: We have focused on per-unit royalties for service outsourcing by assuming that …rm D o¤ers a per-unit service price r to perform post-production services for …rm F . In what follows, we discuss what would happen under an alternative setup in which …rm D can o¤er a two-part tari¤ (R; r) where R ( 0) denotes a …xed fee and r denotes a per-unit royalty. In the OS equilibrium, …rm D chooses (R; r) to maximize its pro…t b D (r; t) + R subject to b F (r; t) R = e F (c S ; t) K. That is, …rm D chooses (R; r) so that …rm F is indi¤erent between outsourcing services and performing them by itself. Let R (r) = b F (r; t) fe F (c S ; t) Kg be the maximum …xed fee that …rm D can charge and let e r be the solution of b 0 D;r (r; t)+@R(r)=@r = b 0 D;r (r; t) + b 0 F;r (r; t) = 0. Since an increase in r has a strategic e¤ect that increases p D and p F and bene…ts both …rms, the service price that maximizes the joint pro…t of the two …rms satis…es e r > c S .
Let e K be the …xed cost which satis…es R (e r) = 0. If K is high enough to satisfy K > e K, …rm D o¤ers (R; r) = (R (e r) ; e r) in the equilibrium where R (e r) > 0 and e r < r hold. In this case, de r=dt < 0 can hold and a tari¤ reduction hurts consumers and lowers world welfare under a range of parameterizations as in our base model. 29 As for the liberalization of service FDI, a reduction of K reduces R (e r) but it does not a¤ect e r when K > e K. If K is reduced to satisfy K e K, on the other hand, R (e r) = 0 holds and it is optimal for …rm D to set r = r. That is, …rm D o¤ers (R; r) = (0; r) in the equilibrium if K K . Hence, a reduction of K to a su¢ ciently low level belowK converts a welfare-reducing trade liberalization into welfare-enhancing one as in our base model. The qualitative nature of our main results, therefore, would remain unchanged under this alternative setup that incorporates two-part tari¤s for service outsourcing.
Trade liberalization with endogenous FDI costs: We have explored the e¤ects of the liberalization of goods trade and service FDI by treating the tari¤ rate and the …xed cost of service FDI as exogenous variables. As discussed in the Introduction, many countries have committed to maintaining low tari¤ rates under GATT/WTO multilateral agreements. Consequently, for many countries it is no longer possible to use tari¤s as ‡exible policy instruments to enhance domestic welfare. In contrast, concerning service FDI, the limited progress of GATS means that countries can still manipulate the in ‡ows of service FDI by raising the levels of regulatory impediments (see footnote 7). We can investigate the e¤ects of trade liberalization (a reduction of tari¤ rate from t 0 to t 1 ) with endogenous FDI costs by assuming that the domestic government chooses K to maximize domestic welfare under the exogenously given level of tari¤ rate t.
Suppose that, before Stage 1, the domestic government chooses the level of K at Stage 0, taking the tari¤ rate t as given. Let K (t) denote the …xed cost of service FDI that the domestic government chooses to maximize domestic welfare, which is uniquely determined in the equilibrium. We can show that there exists a range of parameterizations in which the domestic government chooses K (t 0 ) > 0 and K (t 1 ) > 0, and CS(K (t 1 ); t 1 ) < CS(K (t 0 ); t 0 ) and W W (K (t 1 ); t 1 ) < W W (K (t 0 ); t 0 ) hold where 0 t 1 < t 0 . This means that consumer surplus and world welfare can be decreased even if the domestic government can optimally adjust the level of K. An intuitive explanation is as follows. In response to the tari¤ reduction, the domestic government changes K from K (t 0 ) to K (t 1 ) to maximize domestic welfare. Proposition 4 tells us that, holding the tari¤ rate …xed, the equilibrium consumer surplus is decreasing in K while …rm D's equilibrium pro…t is increasing in K. We also …nd that the equilibrium tari¤ revenue can be either increasing or decreasing in (or a non-monotone function of) K. Hence the relationship between domestic welfare and K is ambiguous, and it depends on parameterizations. 30 We can verify that the domestic government may increase K in response to the tari¤ reduction, or may decrease it but not to a low enough level that guarantees welfare-improving tari¤ reductions. 31 In such cases, the tari¤ reduction could hurt consumers and decrease world welfare. Under such a situation, by forcing the domestic government to reduce K, multilateral negotiations such as GATS can increase world welfare as well as consumer surplus, and convert the welfare-reducing trade liberalization into the welfare-enhancing one. Hence, endogenizing FDI costs do not change the qualitative nature of our results.
More than one domestic …rm: We have analyzed the strategic interaction between …rms D reduction hurts consumers and reduces world welfare if (@e r=@t) < min
is satis…ed if the initial tari¤, t, is su¢ ciently small. Hence, even if two-part tari¤s for service outsourcing are considered, a tari¤ reduction increases the service price, hurts consumer surplus, and reduces world welfare under a range of parameterizations.
3 0 In international oligopoly models, any policy that increases foreign …rms' operation costs generates strategic e¤ects that cause rent-shifting, and hence such a policy tends to result in ambiguous welfare e¤ects in each country.
3 1 The formal analysis is provided in another version of the paper (Ishikawa et al., 2008) .
and F by assuming that only one …rm can produce the …nal good in the domestic country. One can consider an alternative setup in which N ( 2) symmetric domestic …rms, indexed by D1, D2, ..., DN , produce di¤erentiated products. In the presence of more than one domestic …rm, the qualitative nature of our main results remains unchanged if …rm F negotiates prices for service outsourcing with one domestic …rm at a time in a sequential fashion. In particular, suppose that …rm F …rst negotiates with …rm D1 on service prices, and, if …rm F decides not to outsource services to …rm D1, then …rm F performs services by itself with service FDI or negotiates with …rm D2, and so on. 32 In the product-market competition stage, N +1 …rms compete in a Bertrand fashion under di¤erentiated oligopoly. The alternative model has a unique pure-strategy equilibrium, which is an FDI equilibrium or an OS equilibrium, depending on parameterizations. In the OS equilibrium, the equilibrium service pricer can increase as the tari¤ is reduced, and our main comparative statics results hold under a range of parameterizations. Alternatively, suppose that domestic …rms simultaneously o¤er service prices, and …rm F accepts one of the o¤ers or rejects all o¤ers. If domestic …rms have di¤erent per-unit costs for performing post-production services for …rm F , there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium in which a domestic …rm o¤ers r = r when the domestic …rm's cost is substantially lower than the other domestic …rms'costs. 33 Non-tari¤ barriers: Since a tari¤ is a pure transfer from …rm F to the domestic government, a reduction in t does not directly a¤ect world welfare. Hence, a tari¤ reduction deteriorates world welfare whenever it increases both prices of goods D and F . We can interpret t as a proxy for non-tari¤ barriers rather than a tari¤. Then, a reduction in t results in the saving of real costs, which directly works in favor of world welfare. In this case, a reduction in t may improve world welfare even if it increases both prices of the goods. Nevertheless, it can be shown that @W W (K; t)=@t > 0 can hold under a range of parameterizations, and hence Propositions 2 and 3 hold under the alternative interpretation of t. 34
Speci…c tari¤: We have considered ad valorem tari¤s, given their prevalence in the real world. In the case of speci…c tari¤s, the burden of a tari¤ is proportional to the amount of sales, x F , rather than to the revenue, p F x F . Hence, the …rst-term of the RHS of (14) representing the direct e¤ect is replaced by b x F (r; t) e x F (c S ; t) in the case of speci…c tari¤s. Since service outsourcing to …rm D weakens the degree of product-market competition, b
x F (r; t) > e x F (c S ; t) could hold. In this case, dr=dt < 0 holds if b x F (r; t) e x F (c S ; t) is su¢ ciently positive, and a tari¤ reduction could hurt consumers and enhance world welfare. Under linear demands, however, we can verify that b x F (r; t) e x F (c S ; t) < 0 always holds, and it outweighs the strategic e¤ect. Hence, dr=dt > 0 always holds with both speci…c tari¤s and linear demands.
Cournot competition: Consider an alternative setup in which …rms compete against each other by choosing quantities. Suppose that, in an OS subgame, …rm D increases the quantity of good D, holding the quantity of good F …xed. This does not a¤ect …rm D's pro…t from performing post-production services for …rm F , (r c S )x F , since the quantity of good F is …xed. Under Bertrand competition, on the other hand, an increase in the price of good D, holding the price of good F …xed, increases (r c S )x F , because it increases x F . That is, unlike Bertrand competition, Cournot competition does not capture the idea that, although …rm D can increase the sales of its own product by adopting a more aggressive strategy, such a strategy also reduces its pro…t from performing services for its rival …rm.
The di¤erence mentioned above plays an important role in the determination of the sign of dr=dt. Recall Lemma 3 and the discussion presented right after the lemma. In the equilibrium of the OS subgame with the service price r = r, …rm F 's unit cost of production is r, which is greater than its unit cost c S in the equilibrium of the FDI subgame. The higher unit cost works in the direction of making …rm F 's revenue smaller in the equilibrium of the OS subgame. This e¤ect exists in the model under Cournot competition as well. In the model with Bertrand competition, there is another e¤ect to be considered. That is, service outsourcing induces …rm D to charge a higher price to goods D so that …rm F can sell more, because …rm D can make pro…t from selling services to …rm F . This e¤ect works in the direction of making …rm F 's revenue greater in the equilibrium of the OS subgame. As mentioned above, the second e¤ect does not exist in the model with Cournot competition. This implies that the direct e¤ect captured by the …rst term of the RHS of (14) is negative. 35 Then dr=dt < 0 holds only if the strategic e¤ect is positive and su¢ ciently large to overshadow the direct e¤ect. With linear demands, we can verify that the second-term is positive but not large enough to overshadow the direct e¤ect, implying that dr=dt 0 always holds under Cournot competition with linear demands. 36
Conclusion
Post-production services such as sales, distribution, and maintenance consist of an important subclass of services. Although the liberalization of the trade in goods has made substantial progress through multilateral negotiations under GATT/WTO, the progress of the liberalization in the service sector has been limited so far. In this paper, we have uncovered a previously unnoticed importance of the liberalization in the service sector by exploring an international duopoly model that captures the linkage between product market competition and provision of post-production services. That is, we have found that the trade liberalization of goods may have negative welfare e¤ects if it is not accompanied by the liberalization of service FDI.
The trade liberalization reduces trade costs, and this intensi…es competition between a foreign …rm and a domestic …rm in the product market. At the same time, when the foreign …rm outsources 3 5 In the case of Cournot competition, the equation analogous to (14) where the …rst term captures the direct e¤ect and the second term captures the strategic e¤ect.
post-production services, the trade liberalization may induce the domestic …rm to charge a higher service price to absorb a part of the foreign …rm's incremental pro…t due to lower trade costs. We have demonstrated that, if the foreign …rm's …xed cost of service FDI is relatively high, the latter negative welfare e¤ect may overshadow the former positive one so that the trade liberalization harms consumers and lowers world welfare in a range of parameterizations. Importantly, this negative welfare e¤ect of the trade liberalization is mitigated and eventually turned into a positive one as service FDI is also liberalized. This is because a reduction in the …xed cost of service FDI decreases the price of service outsourcing that the foreign …rm would accept. Our analysis has therefore indicated that the liberalization of service FDI is important not only because it reduces per-unit costs of post-production services but also because it recovers gains from the trade liberalization in goods for both consumers and world welfare. Making progress on the liberalization of service FDI under GATS is crucial to secure positive welfare consequences of the trade liberalization under GATT/WTO.
We o¤er two …nal remarks to conclude the paper. First, we comment on the di¤erence between post-production services and intermediate inputs in our framework. In our international duopoly model, the foreign …rm has an option of outsourcing post-production services to its domestic rival or performing the services by itself in the domestic market. Since we focus on a class of postproduction services that are indispensable for the consumption of goods, it is possible to consider a model with an analogous logical structure in which post-production services are replaced by intermediate inputs. For example, one can consider a foreign …rm that does not have the facilities to produce an intermediate input, and can suppose that the foreign …rm determines whether it procures the intermediate input from its domestic rival or produces the input by building its own production facilities. 37 A critical di¤erence between our model and the alternative model with intermediate inputs is the role played by the liberalization of service FDI and its connection to the liberalization of trade in goods. Since intermediate inputs are not services but goods, service FDI has no direct e¤ects on the foreign …rm's make-or-buy decision in the alternative model. In contrast, the liberalization of service FDI plays a critical role in our framework. That is, in order to perform post-production services, the foreign …rm needs to undertake service FDI and establish its own service facilities in the "domestic" market. In our analysis, the connection between production and post-production services has yielded a novel policy implication that the trade liberalization should be accompanied by the liberalization of service FDI to secure its positive welfare e¤ects. The recent progress of the trade liberalization is not yet accompanied by the su¢ cient progress of the liberalization of service FDI, and this reality has motivated us to study the connection between production and post-production services in international contexts. Also, since the trade liberalization of goods a¤ects the intermediate-good market as well as the …nal-good market, policy implications of the trade liberalization may be di¤erent between the model with intermediate inputs and the model with post-production services.
Second, given that imperfect competition in the product market is an important element of our analysis, one may argue that strengthening product market competition could be a substitute for liberalizing service FDI. Suppose that the domestic government has stimulated competition in the product market by inducing …rms' entry, and consequently there are N ( 2) domestic …rms. As we discussed in Subsection 4.2, the liberalization of service FDI can still be critical in recovering gains from the trade liberalization of goods, as long as the price for service outsourcing is determined by one-to-one negotiations. Also, although the domestic government could induce the entry of some independent service organizations, the liberalization of service FDI could still be critical as discussed in Subsection 4.2.
There are several directions of related research that are left for future work. One direction concerns the nature of post-production services. That is, although we have focused on a class of post-production services that are indispensable for the consumption of goods but do not a¤ect the demand for goods, it is also important to consider another class of post-production services such as marketing and repair services that a¤ect the demand for goods. Also, another promising direction of future research seems to be empirical works that investigate the relationship between trade liberalization in goods and liberalization in service sectors. 38
2 dp D dp
The second-order su¢ cient conditions of pro…t maximization require @ 2 i =(@p i ) 2 < 0 (i = fD; F g) and f@ 2 D =(@p D ) 2 gf@ 2 F =(@p F ) 2 g f@ D =(@p F @p D )gf@ F =(@p D @p F )g > 0. Since we consider the case where the price settings of the two …rms are strategic complements, @ 2 i =(@p j @p i ) > 0 (i 6 = j) holds. We assume @ 2 i =(@p i ) 2 > @ 2 i =(@p j @p i ) to ensure the uniqueness of the equilibrium. By using these conditions, the e¤ects of an increase in r on the equilibrium goods prices are given by (7) and (8) with respect to p i (i = fD; F g) and t, and using the envelope theorem, we have
Since @ b p i (r; t)=@r > 0 is also satis…ed, i (i = D; F ) is always negative. λ F dp F dt < 0 dp F dt > 0 dp D dt < 0 dp D dt > 0K K
